Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 1999 Proceedings

Americas Conference on Information Systems
(AMCIS)

December 1999

Time-Based Competitive Advantage through EDI
for Buyer-Supplier Alliances
Akemi Chatfield
University of New South Wales

Philip Yetton
University of New South Wales

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1999
Recommended Citation
Chatfield, Akemi and Yetton, Philip, "Time-Based Competitive Advantage through EDI for Buyer-Supplier Alliances" (1999). AMCIS
1999 Proceedings. 230.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1999/230

This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 1999 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

Time-Based Competitive Advantage through EDI for Buyer-Supplier Alliances
Akemi T. Chatfield, University of New South Wales, A.Chatfield@agsm.unsw.edu.au
Philip Yetton, University of New South Wales, P.Yetton@agsm.unsw.edu.au
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), a subset of Interorganizational Systems (IOS), refers to the computer-tocomputer exchange of structured data files. EDI involves
two distinct types of EDI users: initiators and adopters
(Nygaard-Andersen and Bjørn-Andersen 1994). The
initiator of an EDI initiative invests significant resources
to develop EDI applications and to promote the EDI
network to its trading partners. A key driver for the
initiator’s EDI investment is to gain a competitive
advantage from improved relationships with their
suppliers and customers. Supporting this strategy, Cash
and Konsynski (1985) conclude that new strategic
opportunities are created by Interorganizational Systems
(IOS), asserting that these network technologies are a new
strategic weapon that "redraws competitive boundaries".
Against that, more recently, Benjamin, de Long and Scott
Morton (1990, p. 35) conclude: "Gaining competitive
advantage from EDI applications is much more difficult
than it might appear."
This paper is motivated by the contradiction found in
the literature about the arguments for EDI use and its
effects on strategic benefits. The contradiction in the
literature reflects a gap between theory and practice. In
this paper, we start filling the gap by focusing on timebased competitive advantage, a subset of the potential
strategic benefits, and by addressing the following
research questions: What is the role of EDI in time-based
competitive advantage for buyer-supplier alliances?
Under what conditions does the EDI initiator build a
sustainable time-based competitive advantage?
In the paper, we present a case study of Honda’s timebased competitive advantage through EDI for its alliances
with external suppliers. The key findings are that timebased competitive advantage through EDI requires
strategic EDI use by the adopters and that their strategic
EDI use is strongly influenced by existing cooperative
relationships between the initiator and the adopters. The
results have implications for the future research as well as
for managers who are concerned with gaining a strategic
payoff from EDI investment.

This gap between theory and practice was also observed
by Clemons and Row (1993) in their case study of the
impact of manufacturer-initiated EDI and other
information technologies on manufacturer-retailer
relationships in the consumer packaged goods industry.
They report limits to the potential strategic payoff from
new EDI-enabled logistics management practices because
of “considerable resistance” by expected adopters.
Finally, Bensaou (1993) finds mixed results of the impact
of EDI use on interfirm cooperation in the automotive
industry. He reports that EDI use was positively related
to the improved interfirm cooperation among the Japanese
buyer-supplier relationships, whereas he found little
impact of EDI use on the US counterparts.

Method
Our focus on the impact of EDI on time-based
competitive advantage required a strategic EDI initiative
that was successfully implemented. This “selection bias”
is a direct function of the research questions addressed in
this paper. Strategic EDI initiatives that failed, caused by
extraneous factors, such as a lack of top management
support or inadequate EDI knowledge, are not relevant to
our research focus. Honda’s EDI initiative was successful
with a high rate of diffusion across its supplier value
chain and its strategic benefits are central to performance.
Honda is widely recognized as a leading world-class timebased competitor (Blackburn 1991).
Given the contradiction between theory and practice
discussed above, we adopted the inductive theorybuilding case study method discussed by Eisenhardt
(1989) and successfully used in IT research by, for
example, Clemons and Row (1993) and Henderson and
Lentz (1995-1996). Theory-building case research does
not develop a priori hypotheses. Instead, it enables us to
extract rich data in detail and to encourage novel
constructs and propositions to emerge inductively through
the process of field investigation.
The case study was conducted in 1995 at various
initiator and adopter sites in Japan. Open-ended
interviews were used, rather than structured interviews
with a priori questions, with the focus on identifying
whatever factors were considered important by
interviewees. Twenty-three interviews with senior
managers and EDI/IT managers at the initiator’s sites
often lasted over two hours, and often multiple visits were
required. The initiator was asked to provide a list of
adopters that could be interviewed. All interviews were
recorded. In addition to the initiator’s head office, visits
were made to twelve of its adopter’s work sites, including

Contradiction between Theory and Practice
While there are successful EDI investments made by
American firms such as American Airlines and Wal-Mart,
certainly, the difficulties described by Benjamin and
others are common and wide-spread in practice. In her
study of Fordnet, a proprietary EDI initiated by Ford of
Europe, Webster (1995) observed the absence of
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships, which are
presumed in the literature to emerge through EDI use.
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auto assembly and component manufacturing plants.
When possible, the primary source data were validated
with external sources and documents. In addition, we
analyzed secondary source data, which include the
company publications (Annual reports 1965-1997) and a
number of Japanese books written by Honda’s two
founders: Soichiro Honda (e.g., Honda 1963) and Takeo
Fujisawa (Fujisawa 1986). The two founders have
strongly influenced Honda’s current management
philosophy and practice.

and efficiency of problem-solving at the factory floor
levels.
Honda’s integrated EDI system is a proprietary
network system developed in the mid-80s. It is integrated
with Honda’s corporate database and such strategic
information systems as JIT production management
system. It is also integrated with its manufacturing
process technologies, such as computer-aided design and
manufacturing systems (CAD/CAM). Honda’s EDI was
widely diffused to its external suppliers. In addition,
nearly all first-tier suppliers made significant changes to
their internal processes and integrated Honda’s EDI
applications with their internal applications. This high
systems integration by the suppliers enables Honda and
each of the networked suppliers to exchange a wide
variety of company specific and relation specific
information (such as purchase orders, forecast for
production, just-in-time production schedules, and 3-D
CAD drawings of parts and components) in a timely
manner.

Honda and its EDI
While the company was established in 1948, Honda
started manufacturing its first car, N360, in 1966, which
makes Honda the last entrant to the Japanese automobile
industry. The domestic market was very competitive,
dominated by Toyota and Nissan, with ten other
automakers. Despite its last mover disadvantage, Honda
had rapidly grown to number three in production and
sales in Japan (Japan Automobile Manufacturers
Association 1998). Furthermore, while the last entrant in
Japan, Honda was the first Japanese automaker to
establish overseas production plants in the US and in
Canada. Unlike Toyota, Honda entered without a joint
venture partner. Honda is, today, a global automaker,
with production plants in 34 countries and regional R&D
centers in Japan, North America, and Europe.
For many manufacturing industries, including the
automotive industry, how quickly the firm responds to
customer needs importantly depends on its speed to
market. Honda adopted time-based competitive strategy
in the early 1980s. This is a value-added strategy based
on the extension of the principles of just-in-time (JIT) and
total quality management (TQM) to the entire production
system (Stalk and Hout 1990; Blackburn 1991). Honda
understood the importance of involving all functions
within the firm and also including external suppliers.
At Honda, high quality buyer-supplier collaboration is
essential to its core business processes. Like other
Japanese automakers, Honda organizes its production
systems based on a variant of JIT inventory control
methods. Honda’s time-based competitive advantage
requires that Honda had to take time out of all parts of the
supplier value chain: supplier component design,
component manufacturing, quality control and JIT
delivery to Honda assembly plants. Mr. Fujisawa, first
vice president and co-founder, was credited for his role in
identifying the growing complexity within Honda that
was due, in part, to its subcontracting practice. Honda
outsourced 70-75% of its components. Honda launched
in 1970 its first ‘All Honda Idea Contest’ among its
employees, which received 996 entries suggesting
different ways to improve the workflow. Honda
implemented many ideas throughout the 1970s, and
continuously improved its internal flows of information

Time-based Competitive Advantage
Honda has grown from a turnover of $230,000 in 1949 to
almost $40 billion in 1994 (Fortune, August 1995).
Despite the recession and the increasing competition from
import cars in Japan, Honda’s sales were up 13.3% to
$43.4 billion in 1998 and it is one of the only two
Japanese auto companies (the other is Toyota) showing a
profit (Clark 1998). Honda has maintained its profit
margins as it has grown. Its profit margin for 1997-98
was 4.5% which compares very favorably with Toyota
(3.2%) and Nissan (1.2%) (Forbes 1998). Customer
satisfaction for Honda cars was ranked as number one by
an independent agency in the US based on its customer
surveys (J. D. Power and Associates 1997). Honda’s high
performance sustained over time is due, in part, to its
time-based competitive advantage realized by its buyersupplier alliances.
In this paper, we focus on a subset of the potential
strategic benefits from time-based competitive advantage
(Stalk, Evans, and Shulman 1992; Stalk and Hout 1990;
Stalk 1988; Blackburn 1991). Honda’s product
development cycle was used by GM and Ford as the best
practice benchmark. The managers interviewed reported
that Honda’s high performance was related to its superior
lead time in launching a new vehicle. Their view is
consistent to the external evaluation of Honda. Using a
basic measure of the time it takes a production facility to
return to production capacity, Honda was rated first and
Toyota second among North American manufacturers
analyzed (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota and
Honda) in launching a new vehicle (Smith 1998).
Our case analysis reveals that Honda’s integrated EDI
system plays a central role in managing interfirm
interdependence and collaboration with its external
suppliers. Honda’s first-tier suppliers manufacture and
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deliver parts and components to Honda plants according
to Honda’s JIT production schedules. In addition, key
first-tier suppliers design new parts and components.
It is clear that the centrality of EDI is not unilaterally
decided by Honda, but rather, it is mutually agreed by all
parties involved. They share the common desire to
effectively manage high level interfirm interdependence
and complexity. It is also found that the centrality of EDI
in buyer-supplier alliances depends both on close
interfirm cooperation established prior to EDI network
implementation and on mutual agreement to leverage EDI
for time-based competitive advantage. Specifically, the
initiator and the adopter mutually agreed to share strategic
and proprietary information such as production schedules
and CAD drawings across the traditional firm boundaries.
Because of external stickiness associated with the
traditional organizational boundaries (von Hippel 1994),
Honda’s capability in building close and cooperative
relationships with external suppliers is critical for its
sustainable time-based competitive advantage. For this
reason, it is unlikely to find high-level EDI centrality in
adversarial relationships, where the buyer as the initiator
uses coercive power to enforce its EDI network to all
suppliers (for example, Ford in Webster (1995)). Highlevel EDI centrality is also unlikely when EDI initiatives
are merely to automate the existing interfirm workflow or
are largely cost-cutting measures, without clear top
management vision for strategic deployment.

processes and avoid internal restructuring, leaving
inefficient processes intact or ignoring overall
interdependence across processes (Hammer 1990;
Davenport and Short 1990; Willcocks and Lester 1996).
It follows that a firm's unwillingness to re-engineer its
internal systems is a barrier to capturing the strategic
benefits of EDI which require significant changes to
internal processes, such as internal systems integration of
EDI applications with internal information systems
(Nygaard-Andersen and Bjørn-Andersen 1994; Swatman,
Swatman and Fowler 1994).
Evidence from case studies of six Fortune 100 firms
suggests organizational and sociological factors rather
than financial and IS knowledge resources are the critical
sources of resistance to change (Liker, Fleischer and
Arnsdorf 1992). Many large firms, despite their financial
and technical resources, experience difficulty integrating
computer-aided design (CAD) with computer-aided
manufacturing (CAM). A lack of internal systems
integration between these technologies and the resulting
difficulty of transferring design data across functions
limits the firms' use of information technologies and they
do not realize the potential strategic benefits.
These empirical findings are consistent with the
problem of internal systems integration experienced in the
1980s. In 1982, Robert Benjamin published a forecast of
the state of information technology in the year 1990,
where he made seven predictions for IT in the future.
Benjamin and Blunt (1992, p.8) report that all the
predictions for IT made in 1982 were realized, except
one. That is the prediction: “The 1980s will be a decade
of integrating applications across functions.”
So to capture the potential strategic benefits from EDI
investments, organizational changes need to be made
bilaterally by the initiator and the adopters to integrate
EDI with both internal information systems and internal
business processes to take advantage of the interfirm
electronic links.
This paper examines the gap between theory and
practice, in the specific context of EDI-enabled timebased competitive advantage. In the prior EDI research,
direct causality is assumed to exist between EDI use by
network members and strategic benefits accrued to the
EDI sponsor organization. However, the prior research
results are inconsistent. This paper analyzes Honda’s best
practice in time-based competition that leverages buyersupplier collaboration. Analysis finds the central role of
EDI in building a sustainable time-based competitive
advantage. However, realizing a time-based competitive
advantage is not possible without first establishing
cooperative relationships prior to initiating EDI. It is
because buyer-supplier alliances that want to leverage
EDI for a competitive advantage must effectively manage
high-level systems integration and high-level commitment
to joint action of strategic importance.

Discussion and Conclusions
From the perspective of the initiator, the problem of
realizing strategic benefits, in part, stems from the
interdependent nature of the benefits derived from EDI
and, as a result, from the importance of the strategic use
of EDI by the adopters. While some initiators use their
coercive power to demand adoption (e.g., Webster 1995),
in general, initiators cannot control how different adopters
use EDI in their internal processes. As the nature of EDI
benefits is interdependent (Riggins and Mukhopadhyay
1994), initiators cannot realize benefits without a critical
mass of adopters adopting network technology. While a
high rate of adoption is necessary for tactical benefits,
strategic benefits also require adopters to use EDI
strategically in ways which they create value in interfirm
joint action (Massetti and Zmud 1996).
This strategic use of EDI by adopters typically
requires adopter cooperation in undertaking joint action
with the initiator, such as new product design and just-intime delivery of components. To do this, the adopter
frequently has to make significant changes to its internal
processes. Strategic benefits are unlikely when initiators
and adopters use EDI to simply automate existing
interfirm information flows and decision processes
(Johnston and Vitale 1988; Benjamin, de Long and Scott
Morton 1990; Clemons and Row 1993). In practice,
many initiators simply automate the existing interfirm
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